Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, , 6:13:53 to 6:55:44
The Department of Defence and DFAT discuss fuel security modeling, shadow fleet evasion tactics, and the staffing levels of the Australian Sanctions Office.
Topics: National security, Public service staffing
Speakers: Julie Heckscher, David Shoebridge, Dr Christian Hirst, Hon Sarah Henderson, Mark Baldock, Ellie Whiteaker
>> Uh well, thanks J and thanks for your attendance. Um just to be clear, I'm going to be asking you questions about Russian energy imports and I'm not talking about direct imports. I don't think that's really been what this the evidence has been about today. We're talking about indirect imports including and overwhelmingly we're talking crude oil um that is being refined in third countries and the primary countries seem to be Turkey, India and China although it does the evidence suggest that it's exclusive to those countries. Um and the alleged transformation of the oil uh from of the crude oil to refined products is allowing that crude oil um export to um avoid our sanctions regime. Do we all do we all understand that that was the flavor of the the evidence we had today and that's the basis on which I'll be asking questions. So any questions or clarification about that? No, good. Um the um the AIP pretty much every witness made it clear that a a chunk probably a significant chunk of Australia's oil products that have been imported um are have at least some Russian crude oil in Did did you hear that evidence today? I might go to you. Um, uh, Dr. Hirst, did you hear that
>> Yes, I'm aware of the evidence from
>> Can I just What is the the intented? What's the intent and the purpose of Australia's sanctions regime against Russia? Is is there a stated purpose for
>> Yeah. Yes, Senator. As I said in my opening statement, uh the purpose in coordination with the international community, which is where uh these kinds of regimes have the greatest effect, is to impose costs on Russia for its illegal and barbaric invasion of Ukraine and to constrain its war economy and its resolve and its capacity to continue to wage its war against Ukraine.
And in terms of the sanctions against direct energy exports from Russia, it's to stop Australian money going into Russia, which can then be used to further this war against Ukrainians. Is
it's as simple as saying that we we working with like-mindeds need to make sure there is sufficient pressure internationally to make sure there are that that Russia's capacity is constrained.
Well, I just want to be clear. I don't want my money, if I'm putting fuel in my car, I don't want to pay BP and then a chunk of the money I give BP either directly or indirectly to end up going to Russia to be used to buy weapons um to kill people in the Ukraine. I don't want that to happen from my from my perspective. Is is my perspective shared by the government? Is that the
the that the government absolutely does not want uh for is aware that the Australian community, Australian Australian consumers um would expect that uh the private sector and the industry are doing everything they can to prevent uh this from occurring. The point you're making from occurring that is the foreign minister's made that very clear um uh that that that is absolutely the expectation. So yes, we we share
lot of evidence that that is still happening that when Australians are buying petrol indirectly is is going through countries like um India, potentially China and Turkey as well and finding its way into Russia that will fuel the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Is there a is is it the intent of the Australian government to do what it can
Yes, Senator, thanks for thanks for the question and as as I said in uh my opening statement that we are aware that sadly there is this um challenge complex challenge of uh Russian oil being refined in third parties and uh uh actually measuring that accurately and getting a clear sense is is complex in of itself but we are aware that it's likely occurring and we are working up options across government uh working with industry talking to our like-minded partners ers uh we've had our colleagues in India work closely with Reliance Industries to to make sure we can kind of tackle this problem uh effectively as possible and to make sure we're doing it without uh taking into account Australian Australia's unique supply chains and uh our requirement for fuel security and uh impact on cost. So yes, we're aware and we are working on this.
Well, you would have heard the evidence from the Australian Institute of Petroleum that um that effectively in their evidence at least there's benchmark global benchmark prices being set or regional benchmark prices being set for the fuel and um types of fuel that Australia and did you hear their evidence where they say there isn't a discount that Australia is getting when it's buying refined products that have been sourced in part um from Russia. Did you hear
>> Did you hear that? Yeah, we heard that
>> Y um if that's true, I'm going to assume it is. Um then if we exclude those refineries um or potentially even countries that are um providing us with refined oil products that are sourced in polar apart from Russia um well if their evidence is right and they seem to be the experts that's their job their day job and it wouldn't have an impact in terms of the benchmark price at all. Do you do you have you got evidence to contradict them
>> Uh the the potential impact how glo how our regional region working and uh the potential impact of different measures uh on our supply chain and on price is something that our colleagues in treasury are working very closely on and are contributing to our work on as we work up options. So I'm aware of there are there are views out there but we will we will um rely on um the our experts in Treasury and their modeling to make sure any policy we design uh uh takes into account that that um
>> this isn't a new issue though the the indirect Russian particularly through has been a matter of at least 12 months. Um, are you saying you haven't got that modeling provided by finance? The Australian government hasn't >> doesn't have an answer.
>> Senator Schub, we're just having a few a few audio issues. I just want to make sure the witnesses have clearly heard >> Dr. Hirst, can you clearly understand?
>> So, just it's it's just you're you're asking um this has been this issue's
You say you're waiting for modeling from finance. Um my question is, you know, it's been around for at least 12 months. This concern about us indirectly feeding the Russian war effort through um the indirect importation of Russian crude. It's been around. Have you obtained that get a sense of what if any impact would have fuel price?
>> Dr. Hirst, can you It's I'm Doc. Um, Senator Schub, your audio is breaking up, so we're having some troubles at this end. >> Can Can I just hang on a minute? Senator Schub, uh, Dr. Hirst, can you clearly hear uh, Senator Schub's question?
>> I think he Senator was asking, do we have the modeling? Do we have this has been around for a while, do we have the modeling? I think that was the the question. Um, we we we don't have the full modeling yet. It's these things are um they take some time so we are but
>> All right. Um has the um have you seen the evidence from the um the Australian organizations that indicates that the indirect purchase of crude oil largely through Indian refineries but it's not limited to Indian refineries has provided $2.4 4 billion of support to Russia for its war on Ukraine, which is more than the $1.7 billion directly provided to Ukraine to assist them. Have you seen that? And have you got any evidence that would contradict it?
>> So, so I'm aware of the evidence. Um, and I just um sorry, I'm getting some feedback in my what I'm saying through the audio, but um I I would treat a lot of the data that's out there with some some caution. there is a number of assumptions that underpin it. Um, and there are there are things that we have blind spots all of us have in trying to understand the the what's a complex global market. Um, so I aware of the numbers that are out there, but they're not solid reliable numbers.
>> Well, I'd ask you to provide on notice what basis you make those conclusions. I don't think we've got time now or I don't think it's particularly useful format to go through and identify the particular concerns you have with the data points. Um but could I ask you to provide on a detailed response because for myself I found their evidence persuasive. I found the evidence that we got from the center for research on energy and clean air persuasive um and compelling. And if you've got reasons to doubt it, could you set out the actual basis upon which you doubt their conclusions on notice?
>> Yeah, happy happy to do that on notice,
given um Europe announced its most I think it was can't remember it was round 18 or round 19 of their sanctions against Russia one has particularly targeted um third party supply of Russian crude and oil sorry chair is this breaking up again
>> look it's okay it's not ideal bill. But no, keep going. Senator Schub
the most Europe's announcement at the end of last year, which has been implemented since the 21st of January this year to prohibit the indirect importation, whether transformed or not through a refinery of Russian crude. Um, DEFAT's been aware of that for four months, five months. Is that right?
>> Yes, we we've been aware since they made the announcement. Correct.
>> Europe is one of those like-minded partners you referred to of acting in concert with. Is that right? >> Y um have we taken steps to act in concert with Europe on their efforts? Because I assume just like our efforts are stronger when they're matched by Europe, Europe's efforts will be stronger when they're matched by Australia. So, have we engaging with Europe to see how we can support them and and mirror their their sanctions
>> We we are indeed, Senator. We're in in deep and close consultation, and my sanctions colleagues, I'm sure, will want to add to this answer, but it's a we have a um a a regular dialogue uh with our European partners in the EU on how to apply pressure on Russia and how to support Ukraine. uh it's it's a it's a feature of our engagement and uh each EU sanctions package each EU package we are uh trying to be as in as as lock step as we possibly can be noting we have our own processes but yeah my sanctions colleagues may want to talk to their regular engagement with the with
the EU >> colleagues respond to that
>> Senator Shu bridge hopefully you can hear uh Julie Hampshire from the regulatory and legal policy division in defat just to confirm term. Uh we have uh so many different uh contacts, meetings at all sorts of different levels with different variations of five eyes, G7, bilateral, etc. And they can be generic if they're senior or they can be thematic or focused on things like D-listings, litigation, compliance, uh sanctions packages. So, it's endless and
I am ready.
>> Uh, Senator Schub, we are losing you completely on that last question. Are you I'm going to hand have to hand the call over very shortly. Do you want to have another go? >> You could try and turn your video off. I've just been given some advice. >> a little Yeah, just give it a go. Otherwise, we'll move the call around and then see whether we you might need to put these questions on notice. >> Senator Shoebridge, I I'm sorry. We have got the audio is really deteriorated. We can't hear you. We're just getting little bubbles of audio. So, look, I might um apologies, but we'll I'll move the call to Senator Whiteaker, and we might take this offline to see whether you've got any further questions. I'll now give the call to
>> Thank you very much, chair, uh and thanks to uh the witnesses and officials who are appearing today. I really appreciate it. Um I think some of these numbers were talked about in one of your earlier responses, but I just want to be really clear about this. So um we've banned direct imports from Russia of oil and refined petroleum uh through these sanctions. Could you tell us what was the value of Russian energy imports prior to the invasion of Ukraine and what is it now?
>> Uh thank thank you for the question Senator. Yes. Um as as we confirmed earlier prior to our prohibition of direct energy imports the value was $80 million in 2021. And today, following the prohibition on the direct import of Russian energy products, the value is zero. Nothing.
>> So between 2021 and today, it's gone from a value of 80 $80 million to zero. >> That's correct. So, in the context of whether or not our um our sanctions against Russia have um had any impact, it sounds as though that's a pretty significant a pretty significant impact.
I I I would I would Senator and I and I would just note that um that many of our like-mindeds uh um who are in lock step with us in our efforts here um are still in on in some cases uh directly importing Russian energy products. There are members of the EU, Hungary and Slovakia who continue to import directly Russian energy products. Japan continues to uh import directly Russian energy products. So we are right at the forefront and have one of the string uh most stringent regimes when it comes to direct Russian energy imports.
Thank you. You've just preempted my next question which was going to be how our um how our ban compares with others. So I I think you've you've covered that. Um so I think we've established that we're you know by far not the biggest importer of Russian fuel fuel direct from Russia. could it be said that we are the biggest importer of Russian fuel via third
>> Uh, I'm aware that some evidence earlier today made that claim, but our data shows that that is not not the case. Um, uh, Australia is is certainly not the the biggest importer of, uh, Russian origin fuel products. Um, uh, our trade data shows that Russia's direct exposure oil products were around 689 billion in February 2023 to 2025. Um but China's uh imports were well over that. Um Mongolia, Saudi Arabia ahead of us as well. So we are not the largest. Um China much much further ahead of us.
>> Mhm. Okay. Thank you for that. I understand that in December, Reliance Industries in India announced that it would no longer use Russian crude in its export dedicated refinery at Jimnaga. Is that your understanding?
Uh yes, that that that's correct, Senator. They announced on the 21st of November that um that they would cease uh the import of Russian um oil products into their export dedicated uh facility, the Jamnagar SEZ refinery. Um and we were pleased to hear that the Lloyd's Register, which is the um kind of leading entity on these matters, uh confirmed in December 2025, that that segregation had occurred uh and that therefore um oil coming to Australia from that facility would no longer have um uh refined Russian oil products in
And do you have an understanding of the percentage of imports from uh to Australia from India come from that particular refinery?
>> Yes. So that's from from India um 8% of our refined oil products come from India. But of of that 8% um 88% came from that refinery. So the vast majority of our um uh Indian refined product was from this Jam Nagar facility. So this move by Reliance really does make a significantly reduce the potential uh for us to import substantially transformed Russian oil from India.
What can you tell us about the international mechanisms that might exist to certify track or monitor the origin of crude oil across various energy products?
Uh well Senator there there is no international mechanism in place. This is part of the complexity and the challenge. There is no um recognized international system for for tracking and monitoring. So that's why we are uh working through this this challenge with our like-mindeds. Um and the EU was the first to try this. Um so it's it's complex and there is no inter
>> Thank you for clarifying that. you've talked um quite a bit about your engagement with like-minded partners. Um I might put some extra questions about that on notice. Um I wonder if you could clarify just for our evidence. Um you talked earlier about shadow fleet vessels. Could you just give us a bit of information about exactly what they are and how they're being used to evade sanctions, both our sanctions and and elsewhere in in the world?
I might um hand to my sanctions colleagues on that one.
>> Uh thank you senator for the question. I think it's probably useful just to say that uh this was the largest most creative unprecedented in size package of sanctions that basically like-minded countries imposed on Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. It was inherently difficult compared to other sanctions previously because of course Russia massive country right on the edge of Europe big uh immersed in in global supply chains big economy uh P5 member with veto all of those made it a very complex exercise the sanctions that all like-minded countries imposed after the invasion were effective early on very effective including the oil price cap that was was part of the mechanisms that were imposed on on Russia uh at the outset. However, what we have seen since then and unsurprising really is a massive Russian effort to evade sanctions uh including as you mentioned shadow fleets is just one of the mechanisms that they've used the oil price cap which essentially was uh an endeavor to force uh Russia's revenues from oil down by uh banning things like shipping companies, insurance companies, maritime services and the like providing services if Russian oil was sold in anything over uh a certain price cap uh was really effective early on. Russia managed to avoid uh a lot of these sanctions by basically using what are known as shadow fleets. Now they're not Russian. They're not they didn't start with the um with the invasion of Ukraine. They are a bunch of vessels. A lot of them are tankers uh that basically might use flags of convenience. uninsured or underinsured, unseaorthy old vessels that are basically being used to transport illicit cargos or to beat sanctions or beat other kind of law enforcement mechanisms. The the use of these and the and the number of these shadow fleet vessels obviously escalated hugely once Russia started using these shadow fleet vessels to avoid sanctions. Um, we don't really know how many there are, but likely in the thousands. uh and the certainly European countries are seeing a lot of shadow fleet vessel Uh we're not really seeing them in our waters so far, but the but they are shipping Russian oil, not just Russian, frankly, Iranian as well, DPRK uh material as well. and they are managing to support Russian exporting oil uh still at reduced prices because of the sanctions but they are certainly one of the methods Russia is using to avoid sanctions. Now the the issue of shadow fleets, they present not only problems with evading sanctions, but they're uninsured, underinsured, unseaorthy vessels, they present uh uh environmental risks. Uh and in fact, some of them have been invol involved in oil spills and of course uh they escape. They're not insured. So there's there's a real issue there. Some shadow fleet vessels in European waters in in the north in the Baltic uh in particular have been linked with things like um hybrid threat type activity, sabotage, cutting uh communications pipelines. Uh basically actions taken against European countries as as well as others. So these are a real scourge. The IMO has taken some action and Australia was part and supported that action encouraging all countries around the world to take action in relation to the shadow fleet problem. Um uh as was mentioned earlier uh a lot of uh countries including including us are now sanctioning shadow fleets uh vessels. We've sanctioned 200. Uh there's uh a lot been sanctioned by other countries. Basically all like-minded countries are sanctioning them. In addition to that, I mean, sanctioning them, uh, means that we're we're part of hardening what I would call the shadowfleet ecosystem in some ways, uh, sanctioning them, uh, brings them to everyone's attention. It is a mechanism to, uh, basically put pressure on all shipping registries not to maintain on their shipping registries shadow fleet vessels. Um for us for example, one of the things that we do because some of the Pacific Island countries have been um have been named as uh countries with shipping registries that have actually flagged some of these shadow fleet vessels. So what we've done uh and continue to do is when we sanction vessels, we will actually communicate with uh Pacific Island governments and registries as part of that hardening of the ecosystem for shadow fleet action. We are encouraging and supporting Pacific Island governments to strengthen shipping shipping registries to encourage them to delist sanctioned vessels and other shadow fleet vessels. uh and if we did have shadow fleet activity in our region obviously that would that would give us uh you know further things that we would be looking at doing. Now this is actually really hard. They travel the world and not necessarily in our waters but they are actually doing things that that have impacts on both the effectiveness of sanctions but also on on global issues, global safety, environmental safety, maritime safety and the like. Um, increasingly we see uh also false flag activity. So they might be flying a flag, it's not necessarily that they're actually legitimately registered to that particular country shipping registry. So we're seeing a lot of illicit activity. They're turning off located devices so you can't track them. they're obscuring through falsified documentation uh uh where they came from, their destinations, the owners, the cargos, uh all of those sorts of activities are part of Russian sanctions evasion. We're also seeing quite a lot of activity um like things like use of trans shipment hubs um to basically disguise where uh exports are going. uh we saw see use of alternative currencies to actually again disguise and move money back to Russia and to disguise where trade is actually happening. Uh we've seen quite a bit of that. We're also seeing kind of shell companies proxies very hard to track and trace who actually owns assets. Now uh the sanctions office this is obviously complex for every country in the world to track and manage. uh as we mentioned earlier, we have a lot of engagement, a lot of information sharing with all the other countries that are tracking trends in Russian sanctions evasion because as we find and close gaps, new ones emerge, new methods emerge. This is an ongoing process. Uh one of the things that we've done in addition to kind of the shadow fleet support activity is to increase our outreach and our compliance support for the Australian public. So if uh anyone were to look on the sanctions web pages on the DEFAT site, you would actually see quite a lengthy list of guidance notes, advisory notes and the like. And just in the last probably year, we've put out for example guidance notes on uh how to recognize contractual problems that that have Russian sanctions risks like which transipment hubs, what kind of documentation to look like, looking for proxies and brokers and things like that. red flags for what might indicate sanctions problematic. We've actually put out guidance notes on things like um uh use of alternative currencies, those sorts of things to actually give support for what to recognize, what to avoid, how to minimize and do due diligence on your transactions and trades. And obviously we work across government with ABF in particular, but also AFP and OSRA to track and and make sure to the best we can uh that Australia is not contributing to Russian sanctions evasion. Um so it's it is a mammoth amount of work. It's a really complex problem. Uh it's a constantly evolving problem because Russia is intent on evading sanctions and uh and will continue to try and find ways to do it. Uh there's a lot of activity underway in this space. A lot of close work with ABF AFP. Um but you know not going to pretend we have all the answers. We've closed all the loopholes. We've closed all the gaps. This is a this is a constant evolution uh with a set of sophisticated adversaries trying to find ways to avoid and hide transactions.
>> Thank you. That was a very very useful um and comprehensive answer. So thank you. I've got to hand the call back in just a moment, but I I just have one brief question which is really just a yes or no answer, which is has the government imposed targeted financial sanctions and trade bans against persons and entities involved in the Russian
>> Yes,
>> I'm seeing a few nods. Yes. Okay.
list, but yes.
>> Yeah. Yeah. Well, so it would be useful um I know they're all available on your website, but it would just be useful, I think, for the purposes of this to have a list and and also on notice if you could just take what those sanctions mean for those persons and ent entities in terms of the intended impact. Um and um also for Australian businesses that might have previously been dealing with them. That's it from me. Thank you very much, Chair.
>> Thank you very much, Senator Whiteaker. I've just got some more questions but I wanted to move to uh defense. I've got more questions of the sanctions office. Um but Brigadier just wanting to understand from your capac your perspective uh if the government was to impose a ban on the importation of Russian crude oil from third countries. Have you been able to assess the impact this would have on
Mark Borlock from Department of Defense. we've uh through the National Fuel Council been very involved with all departments on a whole bunch of matters and as a result of that fuel council and in fact the gentleman from the institute of petroleum are on that fuel council as well and um we've got good linkages with industry and I would have to say in answer to your question we would be at the same impact as the rest of the country. So uh as the market would change and prices may fluctuate and there would be a transition period, defense would be no different to any other users uh and as a result the fuel security aspects of the country. I think it'd be too there's too many factors to to to comment on that at this stage.
>> But what is your assessment though if there was going to be a ban on third countries? What's your assessment? What impact might that have on fuel security in this country?
>> Yeah, the market would have to adjust. uh and um there's been other instances previously where the market has adjusted really quickly. So uh again going back to what um Institute of Petroleum said Senator uh the time it takes to adjust is the bit that's the unknown factor here.
>> So how much fuel would we lose coming
>> Well again that's probably a question for the the market. You know they control how many oceangoing vessels are coming in at any one stage and we do know that we are not done some modeling.
Has there been any assessment done and can you share with us what potential impact this could have?
>> So our modeling has been related to conflict and what would happen if conflict impacted the fuel supply chain. We haven't done any modeling on the market in this way
>> and what does that modeling show?
>> It shows that there will be an impact in conflict uh and it will mainly impact aviation fuel as opposed to diesel. uh and uh the National Fuel Council is um in the process of putting all that data together at this stage.
>> And so when you say it would impact Australia at a time of conflict, what can you describe the nature of the impact?
>> Well, at any one stage, as I said before, Senator, there's there's 90 odd vessels coming or 90% I should say, of our imports coming at any one time. uh and so therefore it's a question of whether any ships or one ship will be uh impacted and and comes down to insuranceances. It's a really complex patchwork quilt of cause and effect.
>> So how many days does Australia currently have of fuel supply in this country
>> days of Australia? I think that would be more of a question for the for the manufacturers uh and for department of climate change senator.
>> So you don't hold that information or someone in defense must hold that
information. I have the defense stocks uh but they're of a sensitive nature and not for the public record.
>> Okay. Uh in your view given the precarious nature of our fuel supply generally does Australia need more domestic refining capacity? Again, the
National Fuel Council has has discussed this problem uh at length uh and they are making some recommendations to government are in the process and I I would not be able to comment on the content of that report because it hasn't been submitted yet but certainly they have been looking at ways to improve production, ways to improve storage and distribution capabilities in Australia.
>> Uh if we could have a copy of that report on notice, we would be grateful.
I'd have to check with the Department of Climate Change, Senator, but I will take that away and we'll come back to you. They they own the the the report and how it's being staffed through government at
>> All right. Thank you. Um, is there anything else that you can add from defense's perspective about this issue? Because clearly, uh, many many Australians are alarmed by the prospect that Russian oil is coming into this country via third parties. And the result is and the very strong evidence is that we're in effect delivering more money to Russia than we are to Ukraine.
So Senator, our the Department of Defense's supply partner is Viva Energy and we've been talking at lengths with Viva Energy and they've confirmed that they're complying with all sanctions at this stage. We've also discussed the
issue that there is no prohibition on third country imports. So they're they're they're complying with direct imports.
>> Yes, direct. With regards to indirect, we've had a chat to them about uh India and they've confirmed that there's nothing in their forward work program from India. Uh and that's the limit of our discussions at this stage.
>> So you've had an assurance from Viva.
>> Yes.
>> That there is no fuel being sourced from India.
>> Yes.
>> And have they given you an assurance that there is no fuel being procured by defense that that constitutes Russian crude?
Again, that's a very difficult assurance to give senators. So, they've confirmed that they've not uh that they're complying with all sanctions and they've confirmed that they've ceased all uh imports from India in their ford work program. But as the evidence has already been discussed today, there's really difficult mechanisms for them to confirm anything past that. So, our discussions with them have been with regards to sanctions in India to this to this
stage. and and did you make a particular decision or defense make a particular decision that you were going to seek to not use Russian crude oil coming into this country indirectly?
>> So, defense complies with the government um direction on sanctions, Senator, but we've also
>> I'm asking about indirect imports from third countries and there's currently no prohibition on that, but clearly this is raising many many alarm bells. So I'm asking, have you made a conscious decision not to source any fuel via third countries?
>> So Viva have um advis us that they monitor the situation. They're aware of the sensitivities associated with it and they've um Viva has assured us that they will make decisions based on a number of factors uh such as what we're talking
about today. any other any other countries which pose a particular threat in terms of Russian crude coming via third countries.
>> Uh again, nothing that's been substantiated at this stage, but I think that's more of a question for the Department of Climate Change, Senator. >> Energy environment.
>> Well, if you to the extent that you're able to answer that question or provide any further evidence to the committee on notice, I'd be grateful. >> Okay. uh as along at including in relation to the the matters you've been discussing. Have you been has defense urged uh the government to implement a ban on imports of Russian crude from third countries?
>> Defense is working with the department of foreign affairs on on the the discussion as um Department of Foreign Affairs has mentioned so far today as as a number of departments. So we're all discussing the issue together at the
moment. I mean, it would make your job a lot easier, wouldn't it? You would have the guarantee that you weren't using Russian crude if there was a comprehensive ban on Russian crude from third countries.
>> Defense doesn't see itself as any different to any other fuel user in Australia. Senator, so it would be of benefit to all of Australia and the decisions made before.
>> No, that wasn't my question though with respect. So wouldn't it be much better from a defense's perspective rather than having discussions with Viva and getting assurances about some countries? Wouldn't it be better if there was a prohibition on imports of Russian crude from third countries?
>> So defense is working with Department of Foreign Affairs to to work through the options and all of the options are considered the impacts to fuel security and and so on. Senator.
>> All right. Well, if we could have any more information on notice in relation to your assessments or any correspondence or other briefing papers or other uh letters that have gone between yourselves and foreign affairs in relation to this matter. Um the potential ban on imports of Russian crude oil from third countries. I'd be I'm just want to quickly move to the Australian sanctions office. We've only got a few minutes remaining. Just very briefly, we've had some evidence today raising concerns about the resources of the Australian sanctions office. Are you appropriately resourced? Do you have enough staff and specialty skills to do
>> Uh that's uh I can tell you what our staffing currently is, Senator. Yes, please. >> Uh if that would be of help. So basically as at the end of January the Australian sanctions office has 27.7 uh FTE but allocated 28.8 FTE we have seven of those on sanctions compliance and monitoring. Uh 5.8 on permits and outreach which is a critical part of kind of compliance and monitoring as well. Um 6.8 eight on sanctions strategy and legislation, quite complex legislation, and seven on sanctions listings and litigation. And then there's uh head of the sanctions office.
>> I'm going to be very quick. Sorry, miss. Oh, sorry. Any other any other person?
>> No, no, that's it on the start.
>> I'm going to be super quick because we do need to finish on time. Have you sought further resources for the Australian sanctions office? We
received, you might be aware, Senator, that we uh uh sought resources to basically build and strengthen uh monitoring and compliance in the 2425 budget outcome and we received a budget outcome then which gave us some resources and some resource to ABF and OSRA for uh compliance and monitoring.
>> But have you sought any further budgetary support?
>> Not since then, Senator.
>> So you you have the resources you need to do the job. In other words,
>> well, uh, it's a hypothetical question. With more, you can always do more. We are actually covering listings, legislation, litigation, compliance, and monitoring with the resources we have.
>> All right. Uh, well, look, it is just a minute or so to go before the end of the hearing, so I might leave my questions at that and put the rest on notice. Just look. Uh, can I thank you very much for appearing today. We are most grateful uh for questions on notice if they could be returned by Friday the 27th of February uh we would be most grateful. So thank you so much again. That concludes today's hearing. Thank you to all witnesses who appeared to Hansard to broadcasting and to the secretariat. The committee stands adjourned. Thank you.