Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, , 5:09:32 to 5:47:50
The committee examines the economic impact of sanctions on fuel prices, shipping logistics, and the role of the Russian shadow fleet in bypassing price caps.
Topics: Energy prices, Trade policy
Speakers: Malcolm Roberts, David Shoebridge, Vaibhav Raghunandan, Peter Gneil, Jacinta Nampijinpa Price, Hon Sarah Henderson
>> Oh, thanks chair and thanks for the witnesses for their help. And I you've probably um that last comment was the first question I was going to give um to the the institute. um if we're not getting a discount um or in return for buying um oil which um is sourced in in significant part from Russia, what's in it for Australia if if it's not coming
>> Well, Senator, we um we're buying product from companies uh which meet our needs. So we have a spec we have our own specifications for some of the fuels we use here in Australia. So we don't have a completely unfettered choice of refineries to take product. Uh they need to be able and willing to provide us with the Australian specification fuel. Uh so there's a limited number of refineries that do that. We diversify our sourcing across about 20 countries to ensure that we making the best combination of diverse secure supply and and price points. Um if we look at uh Jamangar for example or India because that has been the focus of a lot of commentary uh as Mr. Carrigan's submission shows we began to take a lot of product from India before the Russia Ukrainian war. India had added to its refining capacity. India had entered the market as the marginal player because it could sell both into Europe and into the Asia Pacific. Uh so they were offering us volume and at a good competitive price. Um so we've sourced our product around one full compliance with Australia's sanctions so clearly no trade with Russia. Um secondly what is a good diversified mix of competitively priced fuel from multiple sources.
>> Spec Mr. If if we've got refineries that we have not just a strong suspicion, but I think pretty much unconspicuous evidence that they're um a a large part of their crude oil supply is coming from Russia. You're saying that they don't they don't sell at a discount that it's the same there's not a not a noticeable difference in the global price between refineries that the world knows is getting a significant chunk of their crude supply from Russia to refineries that that don't. You you're saying there's no noticeable global difference in price.
>> Well, um the refineries are selling into the market at essentially the benchmark price for refineries if you like. what the competitive price is. I mean there'll be variations around that uh in terms of perhaps volumes and length of contract etc. I I'd say most of the supply that we source is under a term contract. So these are not oneoff transactions. These are things that have been negotiated and may be in place for 12 months 2 years. So um it's not a
>> asking I don't mind if you answer Dr. spot price or term contracts. But my question is the same. Are we getting a you know do to petroleum importers do you get a discount if you're buying fuel that you can identify clearly is being sourced in significant part from Russia whether it's a spot price or some contract I'm not there's a difference tell me bit >> it's the same
>> well we get a competitive price from India as we do from elsewhere um whether it's um related to their decisions around where they source their crude oil I can't say
>> what does competitive price from India mean? I mean >> what >> is that code for saying actually you do get a discount from buying from refineries because they're getting a chunk of their supply with sanctioned Russian oil. Is that what I'm meant to believe from that?
>> Well, when we say comparative price, we say the refiners are bidding into the market as a whole. So refineries in India, China, Malaysia, Brunai, Japan, Korea, the list goes on. They're all bidding into the market to secure custom uh and they're obviously having to compete against other parties and companies will diversify.
>> We come back to your benchmark price. So if we take your benchmark price evidence then it shouldn't matter if we exclude um a chunk of the market 15 20 30% of of the market because the other 70% we won't be squeezed. We'll be buying at a the benchmark I assume Australian purchase the amount Australian purchases is not globally significant to change that benchmark price if we move it
around. >> We will continue to buy the quantity of fuel we need. It's just a question of who we buy it from. And the benchmark price the benchmark price is is what detect uh what decides to some extent the bids into the market. But there are also additional costs because we have shipping and other requirements that will vary according to where the source of supply is. >> so the point I was making earlier Senator was if we do if we do move from one source of supply to another uh it's possible that we'll end up with some additional shipping and other costs. Do you want to say anything?
But I would have thought in terms of the the cost per unit per liter of fuel that a differential in shipping costs whether it's coming from you know India or Singapore or South Korea the difference in shipping costs I would imagine would be a margin of a margin and I might get the institute to first respond and then I wouldn't mind either responding to to to this exchange we've had >> the institute the shipping addition sorry yes and the difference in those costs would be margins on margins we wouldn't be talking significant
>> well it's it's also I I I think one of the points I would make about India is as I mentioned before because of its geographical location it's the marginal player in our region because it also has opportunities to sell uh into into Europe
>> but you told me before it's setting a benchmark it's part of a benchmark so we we we we can go back and revisit that but on the assumption that there's a benchmark being set and India is part of setting that benchmark we benefit from the benchmark whether we buy from India or Singapore I was asking you about the um the those other marginal costs you were talking about and I was asking you what the real impact is on price the additional or non- additional transport costs for example as well
>> sure senator that the you're right the the the shipping component is comparatively small compared to say the crude input price of the ultimate ly refined price. Um, but it's more complicated than just the pricing element. Obviously, if you're going further a field, you're extending your supply chains uh and you're introducing more geographical risk um into your supply chains. Um you're also extending the time out by which you can order uh on those uh those parcels that you're seeking. Um and I guess the other key point here is there's no single refinery or set of refineries or countries that would meet uh Australia's volume. Obviously the Indian refineries are have and have been to date um key suppliers uh to Australia. The question is uh how many of the refineries if we were to go to other markets um could genuinely be considered uh clean of Russian product or are we just in a game of whack-a-ole where you're now starting to narrow down and narrow down and narrow down your supply sources and obviously the security risk that goes um with that?
Well, I mean whether or not oil is on water for an extra week or not, I don't think is a fundamental national security issue and it's probably even less than that coming from um some alternate sources than from India. Um but I note what you say. Um did you pick that exchange benchmark set in the additional marginal costs we might have to pay if we had to diversify away from you know refineries that take up and crude.
I think that was a question.
Um yeah, again like I think it's necessary to just say that there are a very limited list of refineries, a very limited group of countries that are still buying Russian crude. So it really does reduce the number of uh supply cut offs you will have so to say if you put bans on imports from these refineries and which is why in our recommendations we recommend that you put in place sanctions on certain refineries that are using Russian crude. Australia's reliance on as my colleagues have already said Australia's reliance on uh imports from India were about 5% uh in terms of say gasoline in 2021 it has grown to a little under 10% now in 2025. So while Australia's needs have grown slightly the imports from India have significantly grown and the reason for this is again twofold. It is that India is a non-sanctioning country. They're getting oil at deeper discounts. They're getting refinery margins. Refineries are making profits. And they know that sanctioning countries are turning a blind eye towards this loophole. And they continue to export the refined products onward. Um again, South Korea, for example, is the biggest provider of refined products to Australia. They don't use Russian crude. They have traditionally been a long-standing partner for imports into Australia. And uh there's no reason that you can't have that sort of diversification again.
>> Uh if if I if I might if I might s just to help um there are as I said there are about 20 countries which we uh import fuel from. Uh you've mentioned South Korea and they are clearly a country in our region that has decided to um cease any Russian imports. Japan has largely done so although I understand there's an exception for Sackland but if we look at the other countries in the region where we draw supply you will see that they do continue to allow Russian crude oil to be imported. Uh so unfortunately in our region at this moment in time um most of the countries that we draw supply from governments have not prohibited the importation of Russian crude.
Well, which takes me to the structure of the EU sanctions. um the EU sanctions. I mean, you you would you're there and you're getting a sense of how it's playing out in real time. But as I understand it, um unless a country is a net exporter like Saudi Arabia, um um perhaps Venezuela if they're not being um bombed and um um and monster but unless the country is a um net exporter um then any country that's exporting fuel products to the Europe to Europe needs to provide evidence of the country of origin of crude oil um and the obligation is on the exporter to provide evidence which may be a chemical breakdown and and the like is is that what's happening in Europe at the
It's not really a chemical breakdown. uh customs authorities across different countries in the EU require traders to supply at astation documentation. Traders within their countries to supply at astation documentation as well as contract terms uh and representations and warranties when they're buying oil from net uh importer countries and more so in terms of high-risk net importer countries which have been identified by the EU as India, Turkey and China. even traders even in cases where they're conducting spot market sales because again as uh representatives from AIP will tell you not all uh oil is bought on long-term contracts even they've been advised to include terms in their contracts which require the counterparties to comply with sanctions and also provide evidence of compliance with the sanctions and again the EU guidelines state that there has to be 60 days without Russian crude into a refinery before they'll be allowed access into the EU market. So for example, uh the EU sanctions came into place on the 21st of January. Uh there have been no cargos that have come into the EU that were purchased after 21st of January from uh any of these high-risk
>> All right. So I mean it could be that the 60 days sort of is playing itself out. Um or it could just simply be they choose not to export to Europe because a significant part of their supply chain >> Yeah. Um back to
>> absolutely like
>> Oh, sorry bab. You feel free to respond
>> No, absolutely. It is true. Like again like I think one of the things that we have been specifically focused on is that we believe that the 60-day margin is not enough because sometimes uh crude feed stocks can last longer uh companies and countries can uh purchase contracts and have it uh over longer periods of time. And the secondary aspect is of course again these are non-sanctioning countries. They have trade relationships with Russia and we've consider constantly iterated that if they're buying Russian oil to supply for the domestic market and are able to use and provide cheap oil to their domestic market that's great. It should just not be external facing.
>> Yeah. Um back to the institute. Um what what I mean what is the what is the actual problem with us putting that requirement on any um exporter to Australia? that same requirement. I mean 5 says it may not be strong enough but you may have a different view but to certify and attest through their supply chain that um no Russian oil has been in their facilities for 60 days um prior to the the product pumped out the other end. What is there a philosophical problem with this? Is there a structural problem with this that the AIP has?
>> Uh it's not a philosophical problem at all. Uh Sander, as we said, it's the EU sanctions are a bit of a work in progress at the moment. We're not as close to it as a as a colleague in Amsterdam, but uh what was released in October was a a short document of frequently asked questions that set a very broad framework where the onus of proof was put back on the trader or the importer. uh and we've already heard that the terms and conditions being applied and they particularly targeted India, China and Turkey as the countries of greatest concern. Um you know from the point of view of industry what we look for is clarity and certainty so we can make decisions to purchase from approved suppliers that we can bring that product into the market without any uncertainty or any risk. So we also need quite a lot of detail about how that's to be done, what constitutes adequate documentation and proof. And we do rely very much on the cooperation of the the other part of the transaction, the the refiner, that they're willing and able to give us credible assurances about their supply chain and the consignments we're receiving. So for us, the devil's always in the detail because no one wishes to enter the market, contract to buy product, discover that things have changed or discover that the rules are in a process of evolving and you may be in breach. So we need clarity and certainty around what that obligation would look like. Europe's gone first. Uh so we're watching very closely. We're talking to our colleagues in Europe to try and understand how those rules are evolving. As I understand it, not all the European member states will be applying these rules. I think, correct me if I'm wrong, but um Hungary and Slovakia won't. And then you have the other member states who might be doing some of their own arrangements under that broad EU umbrella. So, we're very interested in knowing how this will work so we can see if our counterparties in other countries who provide the product to us are able to meet that.
>> All right. Thanks. Well, I'll hand it back to you chair and both particularly thank you for the topics well before dawn in appreciate it.
>> Uh thanks very much Senator Shoebridge. I'll now give the call to Senator Nabajippa Price.
>> Thank you. Um and thank you for your contributions gentlemen so far. Uh I've just got a few questions for the Australian Institute of Petroleum. Um what are the steps that your members take to assure themselves that Russian crude oil isn't entering their supply
>> at this stage? It's a conversation with those suppliers which we have um term contracts in place or we're buying directly from the refinery. Uh that the difficulty is that um at this point we don't have a trigger to re renegotiate term contracts. uh you know these term contracts can have a life of um 1 2 3 years uh and we we can't turn around and say we're no longer accepting the product because either um you've changed your sourcing and we see now that you're using more Russian crude or some other complication. That's one of the reasons why we've said regulation is important to give us a trigger so we can go back to our suppliers and say well you know the law has changed we we this is no longer a compliant product for Australia um can we renegotiate our arrangement um if you're not able to do that then obviously we can't legally bring the product into the country so those conversations but we would also make the point that there's a lot of work to be done in the spot market so uh spot market cargos are essential for maintaining security of supply. Um that's traded out of Singapore using a a plat platform which does not tell us um in nearly all cases what the origin of the cargo is. It matches buyers and sellers on the basis of what the volume might be when it's available. Uh does it meet spec? Uh so it doesn't give us any idea as to where that cargo may have originally come from. Now the Europeans are tackling the problem that that problem in their spot market. So there is you know a prospect that we might be able to do the same here in in this region. Um but unfortunately at the moment we don't own operate control the platform in Singapore that's used by all the spot traders in this region
>> and and Senator >> sorry sorry Senator can I can I just also add just for the avoidance of of doubt the existing sanctions in place for uh cruds um extracted from Russia or refined product um sold from uh directly from Russia uh all Australian suppliers uh are compliant uh with that those ones are a lot easier to track than where there are third party transformations. So any any crude that's going into the two Australian refineries are absolutely not uh from Russian cruds.
>> Okay. Um and so I suppose um what steps would they take if they are unable to assure themselves of the provenence of
>> Well, at this stage the product is is still legal. uh and if a term contract is in place, there's no basis um no legal basis to renegotiate that. You'll be reliant on the goodwill uh and support of your
>> So under current Australian law, your members are bound to continue with a supplier contract even once they identify the source of fuel may be coming from Russia.
Well, those sources do change as as we pointed out. Um, Jimango, which always gets a mention in this discussion, has taken an increasing volume of Russian crude over the last 12 months or so. Now, we're pleased to say that that has stopped. So, um, that is essentially a decision by the refinery. Uh, and with the existing term contracts don't give us an opportunity to reopen that. Uh, there's no legal right to do that. there's just the opportunity to have the conversation and try and persuade the company to ensure that its exports to Australia are not derived from Russian crude. But they have their own problems there because they are operating an integrated facility that's taking large volumes of crude from different parts of the world and pushing it through common user infrastructure and refining it together. So the decision to supply us with non-Russian derived uh product means that they would have to make some significant changes in their own sourcing decisions if they can't physically separate those different
>> So what size investments are your members making on the systems and capabilities to ensure sanctions um compliance?
>> Well, that's a very um important commitment. they've got significant investments in that. Um what they tend to rely on is as much as possible sourcing from their established suppliers um where they have a long-term relationship. Uh now some of the some of the product is sourced from their own businesses especially when they're you know a large multinational. They can source from their own refineries or from other sources which they're very familiar with. Obviously, it's a bit more difficult on the spot market where we don't have that line of sight on the origins of cargos.
>> Okay. I mean, would it be fair to assume that the spot market is more susceptible to being used to sell Russian food?
>> Well, these are transactions done in real time um through a mediated platform with without um in most instances any disclosure of the origins of the cargo. Uh so that that problem is identified in our submission to the inquiry. Uh it's recognized by the EU. Uh and so we're following closely how the EU is going to
>> Okay. And obviously um it is difficult track the tracking of crude oil once it enters the supply. Um uh but what is industry doing to monitor the monitor the Russian shadow uh fleet of vessels transporting Russian crude and how I suppose can this be enhanced?
>> Uh it's a good question because that is a and and Korea has done a lot of good work on this. So I'd like to acknowledge the Russ the Russians are using a variety of tactics to conceal the flow of crude oil. Um we've heard a lot about the shadow fleet. There's also a lot of pipeline supply that is far from clear. It's a very opaque trade. So, there are many opportunities where the Russians are doing their best to conceal the movement of crude oil. Uh, with the shadow fleet, our members obviously have nothing to do with those vessels that have been identified as carrying Russian cargos. Um, and that list of banned vessels continues to grow. Uh, names change. uh all sorts of tactics are adopted by the Russians to conceal what's going on, but uh our members are tracking that and avoiding using any vessels that have been banned.
>> Okay. Um sorry um did you want to provide any more further um I saw you nodding your head on that um particular question if there's anything you wanted to contribute to?
>> Yep. Uh sure. Like absolutely on the shadow fleet about 70% of Russian crude delivered every month is on shadow tankers uh over 70%. So at any point of time you can make the assumption that a installation a refinery a port a country receiving Russian crude is going to receive the majority of the crude comes on shadow fleet tankers. Obviously, Australia has now sanctioned over a 100 Shadow Fleet tankers uh over the course of the last year. Uh a lot of these tankers are indirectly still in Russia in Australia's supply chain simply because they provide crude oil to refineries that Australia is buying refined products from. So, in a sense, Australia is undermining their own sanctions. I know that it's uh currently the refining loophole is legal and open. So understandably that that yeah I can understand that. If I may, I'll also just clarify one point that my colleague made regarding uh different regulations for different countries in the EU on imports of refined products made from Russian crude. And you mentioned Hungary and Slovakia. So unfortunately Hungary well fortunately Hungary and Slovakia do not import from refineries using Russian crude globally. They have their own refineries doing that because they get access to Russian crude via the Dusba and they've continued to buy increasing volumes of Russian crude via the Dusba. Uh refineries in both the countries are operated by MOL refine the product and
Thank you. Um, and back to the institute, what proportion of Australia's fuel would be derived from spot market crude as opposed to term contract agreement?
>> Um, well, I can't give you an exact number because it does vary. Um but I I've always relied on the the rough rule of thumb of sort of 8020 that or possibly even more than that because at the end of the day um we absolutely need to have fuel available in real time. Term contracts are the only way to be absolutely assured that you've got that supply and the spot cargos are necessary to ensure that where there's some unexpected disruptions to supply some spikes in demand etc you can meet it. Um so 9010 8020 overwhelming volume is locked and loaded um a long time in advance under term contracts.
>> Okay. Um and just a couple more questions. Based on your experience with global supply chains, what is the single most challenging aspect of implementing a ban? Is it traceability, contractual constraints or securing uh replacement
supply? I I think that what I would identify as the most important is the willingness of the counterparty the the refinery uh to adjust their practices um to give us um a clear assurance around how they've managed their supply and that the product being sold to us does not have Russian crude. We we have tremendous problems if you wanted to try and track the movement of this product especially when it's being moved covertly around the world. uh if you have a reliable counterparty who can give you honest assurances backed by good evidence that they have taken steps to ensure they don't have Russian uh crude oil in the supply chain for the products they're supplying to us. Um that's the most important thing. So that's the reason why the industry has devoted so much time to discussions, negotiations u with businesses like Reliance so that we have an alignment between the overseas refiner and our
>> Great. Um and if Australia were to restrict imports from refineries known to process Russian crude, where would uh replacement supply most likely come from and how uh quickly could supply chains
we would probably need a transition period. Uh so that one of the first things that we would want to do is if there were established suppliers who were becoming ineligible to supply the market because of their sourcing decisions, uh we would probably want a situation where we could trigger a renegotiation of a term contract and see if they were prepared to make changes that would make them compliant. uh you want to keep the supplier you you have um if they've provided a good product and a reliable basis and you want you'd want to have an opportunity to try and see if you could work a solution. If that wasn't possible, then you'd have to look around the region to see what suppliers had made those changes and could provide those asurances to you. And and that we really won't know that until we're in a position where it's clear that's the policy change and and you know the refiners in other countries begin to make their decisions about the value of the Australian market, what they're prepared to do to retain access
>> Okay. And and just one last question. Um, given you've said trading platforms don't provide line of sight on origin, is compliance primarily based on supplier asurances rather than independent verification?
>> Well, unfortunately the platform doesn't, as you mentioned, give us independent verification. Uh, so it's a conversation that you have with suppliers. Um but because you're dealing with a spot market um you you don't really have an opportunity to be very sure about what you're buying beyond what is provided through the platform which is you know the essential information around the the product delivery times port of loading that sort of thing. So the spot market is unfortunately not as transparent as it
Tra trades are essent. The platforms are essentially designed to match specifications. Suppliers will go to market with a particular specification of the fuel. Suppliers will seek a particular specification of fuel because not all fuels are the same. Um the platform then matches those together. Uh and you have no visibility at all about the origin of that product that you that you had bought. It's just the system was
Thank you for that. That's that's all
>> Uh thank you very much Senator Nabajima Price. I just wanted to quickly ask a couple of questions. We've had some very compelling evidence that the government needs to act straight away to close the loophole which allows Russian oil to come in via third countries. If the government was to act straight away in that respect, can I just understand is it possible to say what impact this would have on Australian fuel suppliers?
>> It's difficult to say because we wouldn't know how suppliers uh in the region would respond. Uh so there will be some suppliers that will probably want to continue to import Russian crude and can't physically segregate that supply uh from the refineries supplying exports. Uh so if if that question's posed to some refineries, they'll decide uh oh we'll probably just cease supplying Australia because we see greater value in retaining our existing supply of Russian crude. Um on the other hand, we would hope that our established partners would see that there's a value in continuing to do so particularly since Australia wouldn't be acting alone. Uh we'd be aligned with the EU. Uh and we look at India for example, which I think about I think Korea statistics were saying about 40% of the middle distillates. So you know that's jet fuel and diesel go to the EU. Um, Australia is not such a big market that people will necessarily make major changes to their business to accommodate us, but where we're acting uh in the same way as other countries which equally um asking for the same thing, then it's quite possible they'll make that decision. Uh I would just say though that it's so until we know the reaction of refiners elsewhere, hard to know. Um but we do have at the moment a mix that we would say is optimized to give us fuel security and the lowest possible prices. Uh if there's a significant change to that u it's possibly going to lead to higher prices.
The other thing I'd add to that Senator is with the EU having made the announcement in July last year. We're now in January that's six seven months of lead time from making the announcement. um we're still waiting to see how that's playing out in practice and I think a lot of the compliance components of that are going to be um still still a fair way to play out uh on that as well. So um the lead time is important um but it's also important to understand that Australia of course is deeply embedded in the Asia Pacific region. Europe is a little bit further. So the implications for Australia are probably greater than they are for the
for the EU. I guess without legislation, can I also put to you why can't your members just stop using third party Russian oil full stop without without the need to change sanctions?
>> Certainly. Um it's a natural question to ask. First of all, it's hard to identify all the instances where Russian crude oil might be in the supply chain and you where uh term contracts are in place, there's not a legal basis to trigger a re renegotiation of that contract. So, you're reliant on the goodwill of the refiner to take into account your concerns and whether they can accommodate you.
>> And have your members tried to do that?
>> Those conversations have been held particularly with reliance.
>> Okay. So putting aside the contractual obligations, there are conversations underway right now to see whether by agreement those contracts can be varied.
>> Yes, the the industry is testing what other what refiners can do to uh to meet this change if that's what's going to occur. Um we we go back to the point though that we we see regulation as fulfilling a number of purposes. is it creates a level playing field so it can capture all importers and all import channels into Australia and we think that's important for sanctions to be effective. It gives uh all all parties some certainty around what's required for market access into Australia and that's very important when you're committing yourself to long-term contracts. Um it certainly creates an opportunity for us to have discussions uh with S&P around the design and the information being supplied by the trading platform in Singapore. So we can address those problems in the spot market. Um all these things are are far more easy to prosecute and and conduct and get commercial negotiations when we have government in support. uh we we've seen the change in Jamaa because of EU sanctions, American pressure and we would like to think you know industry discussions um with suppliers. So it does take converging advocacy and pressure to bring about change.
>> So is it your position that to change supply arrangements which may be contrary to the terms of a contract >> could potentially be a breach of that I mean, if your if if your members are saying, "Well, hang on a minute. We're varying the contract because we believe that this in effect breaches the spirit of the law." >> Then can I put it to you that that may necessarily not be a breach of a supply
If the law changes um materially um um an importer will have the opportunity to trigger a review of the of the contract to say
>> so the legal position is more clear. I understand that.
>> Yes. And so that's that's the firm ground in which you can reopen uh a discussion with um your overseas refinery. Yeah. >> That the fuel is no longer compliant with Australian conditions. um we best talk about that and work out whether you're able to make it compliant.
>> Are your members willing and able to change their supply contracts so that there is no Russian oil coming into Australia?
>> Well, if the government changes policy will comply with the policy as we do today.
>> So this the bottom line is this is a matter for the government to act.
>> Well, absolutely the industry will comply whatever the sanctions the regime is. we you know that's um a decision for the government. Uh I I would say that it's a decision that needs to be if if that decision is made the design of another set of sanctions would need to be done carefully to ensure fuel security and fuel prices are not put at risk and that would need consultation with industry. Uh it would need probably a transition period to allow us to find alternative sources of supply if we need to. Um, so there's a lot involved. Um, but if the policy changes, the industry will comply.
>> All right. Thank you so much, Vibav. I'm just wondering whether you have any final observations you wish to make
>> Um, none really. Thank you very much for the opportunity to present and really glad to hear from even the industry on this. Thank you.
>> All right. Thank you both. Uh, thank you all very much for attending today. We really are very grateful to you. Uh any questions on notice should be returned to the committee by Friday the 27th of February 2026. And again our sincere thanks.
>> Thank you.